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Reducing the Welfare Dependence of Single-Mother Families:
Health-Related Employment Barriers and Policy Responses
Jean Kimmel
Abstract
The problem of rising health care costs and the related increased dependency on health
insurance coverage has moved to the forefront of the U.S. policy agenda in recent years and was
a fundamental component of President Clinton's 1992 campaign platform. However, the
President's 1994 health care reform proposal was unsuccessful, and current GOP proposals to cut
the rate of growth of Medicare and Medicaid spending while the eligible population and costs both
continue to grow fail to address the problem of coverage.  In fact, one likely side effect of the
cost-shifting to private insurance carriers will be to increase the ranks of the uninsured.  This
paper addresses one aspect of the coverage problem: specifically, how do the competing interests
of public and private coverage for single mothers affect these mothers' willingness to participate
in the labor market?   And, how might restrictions concerning welfare eligibility currently
undergoing legislative debate enter into the equation?
     1The sudden loss of all Medicaid benefits when income exceeds the AFDC break-even income level is referred
to as the Medicaid notch.  Other costs of working are far less likely to be offset by earned income, particularly child
care costs.
Reducing the Welfare Dependence of Single-Mother Families:
Health-Related Employment Barriers and Policy Responses
Jean Kimmel
I. The Links Between Health Insurance Coverage, Employment, and Policy Reform
The significant increases in health care costs during the 1980s, accompanied by the decline
of relative earnings (and total compensation) of less-educated individuals, has led to the increasing
realization of the importance of public and private health insurance coverage to individuals' work
choices.  While most single mothers could be expected to earn enough money by participating in
the labor force to replace forgone AFDC benefits, it is far less likely that these mothers could
replace forgone Medicaid benefits.1  According to Kronick (1991), the probability of receiving
employer-provided health insurance coverage declined for low-income workers during the 1980s.
And the fastest growing group of the uninsured are poor children. Also, poor health is more
prevalent for lower income individuals, and so it serves as an additional impediment to
employment.  Comprehensive welfare reform plus health care reform that involves significant cuts
in the rate of growth of Medicaid expenditures will dramatically alter the incentive structure facing
single mothers.  This paper examines possible impacts of these changes on employment behavior.
The current approach to welfare reform is best characterized by the devolution of support
programs to the states. One standard not left to the states is the maximum duration of eligibility
for AFDC benefits: one version of the proposed federal legislation imposes a five-year limit on
the total number of years of eligibility per person.  Considered in conjunction with the Medicaid
cuts, significant numbers of poor single mothers and their children could be left without a safety
net and will be unable to procure regular, quality health care. Because these legislative changes
are still underway, it is not known at this time what sorts of Medicaid eligibility restrictions the
states will impose to control expenditures, but one possible change is to subject Medicaid
eligibility to the same five-year time limit as AFDC coverage. Current welfare provisions link
Medicaid eligibility directly to AFDC eligibility for most single mothers.
The policy changes included in this paper's simulations include a five-year total time limit
for AFDC (and Medicaid) coverage, and mandated employer-provided coverage for full-time
workers. The simulations reflect approximations to the full economy-wide effects that would result
from the policy changes. And, potential policy changes not considered explicitly here come into
play as well, probably the most important of which are the proposed significant cuts in the rate
of growth of Medicaid expenditures. Once hospitals and providers are pushed to their budgetary
limits with regard to the percentage of full costs reimbursed by Medicaid, then cost-shifting might
occur. That is, prices charged to those privately insured might be inflated to compensate for some
portion of the Medicaid shortfall. However, as these private costs rise, private health insurance
2
     2In her study of the link between AFDC recipiency and Medicaid coverage, Blank (1989) does not find that
Medicaid coverage serves as a disincentive to work.
coverage rates will also fall, resulting in a larger percentage of the population being uninsured.
So, clearly many of the current budgetary and policy changes currently under consideration are
interrelated.
II. Review of Literature
The existing literature relating health insurance benefits to employment behavior is a recent
but growing one, but focuses mainly on employer-provided coverage without consideration of the
importance of publicly provided coverage. There are some notable exceptions, however.  Moffitt
and Wolfe (1992) estimate the effect of the Medicaid program on employment behavior. They find
that mandating employer coverage would increase the probability of labor force participation
(LFP) of single mothers by 8 percent, and that improving the expected benefits of Medicaid would
decrease that probability, but by a smaller magnitude.  
Wolfe and Hill (1995) examine the effect of maternal and children's health on the work
effort of low-income single mothers and conclude that "extending health insurance coverage to
all children of single mothers without respect to the mothers' AFDC status would induce a large
percentage of these mothers to seek and accept employment...." Winkler (1991) models Medicaid
explicitly as an in-kind benefit and considers its effects on labor supply behavior jointly with the
AFDC program.  She finds that Medicaid has a small but significant negative impact on the
decision to work.2 A drawback to Winkler's empirical analyses (as she mentions on p. 313) is the
fact that the availability of employer-provided health insurance coverage, an obvious alternative
to public health coverage, is not considered.  McCool and Monheit (1991) find that for single
mothers, increased Medicaid eligibility at zero hours increases the probability of not participating
in the labor market or working parttime. Yelowitz (1995) finds that increasing the income limit
for Medicaid eligibility has a positive effect on LFP, but more so for ever-married women than
for never-married women. And finally, Dor, Hunt-McCool and Johnson (1992) examine the effect
of employer-provided health insurance coverage on the employment behavior of married women.
They show that an increase in the probability of receiving employer-provided health insurance
coverage significantly increases the probability of labor force participation for married women
whose husbands do not currently possess such coverage.  Note that nowhere in the existing
literature is there an examination of the types of policy changes addressed in this paper.
III. Theoretical Framework and Econometric Issues
The fundamental research question is to examine the manner in which health-related
employment barriers affect the labor force participation behavior of single mothers.  The primary
barriers addressed here include the relatively low probability of receiving health insurance
3
     3See Phelps (1973) for the derivation of a utility-maximization model which develops the notion that the
consumption of health services takes time.
coverage from the employer, and the higher probability of Medicaid eligibility if the mother does
not work.  Additionally, the independent effect of maternal and child health on employment is
examined.
The underlying utility-maximizing model is comparable to that used by McCool and
Monheit (1991),  and is similar to Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) as well. It is drawn from Becker's
(1965)  household production model, and extended to model the demand for good health by
Grossman (1972). The mother is assumed to maximize utility where utility is expressed as a
function of work hours, nonlabor income, and family health. The mother maximizes this utility
function subject to standard budget and time constraints, as well as a health production function.
In the budget constraint, total market expenditures (including any out-of-pocket medical care
expenditures or health insurance premium payments) equal total unearned income (excluding
transfers) plus transfer income (including cash and in-kind transfers).  
Ideally, total time would be expressed as the sum of market work, home-production time
(including health production), and leisure time.3  Data limitations restrict the components of total
time to market time and nonmarket time. In the health production function, health status is
determined by the consumption of market-based and home-produced health services; the mother's
time is a primary factor in the latter.
Theoretically, an additional constraint should be an equation expressing the fact that total
compensation is comprised of both wage and nonwage benefits, where the latter includes health
insurance coverage.  While theory tells us that employees must give up wages to get nonwage
compensation, this tradeoff is nearly unobservable empirically.  The problems are a lack of
sufficient data to fully explain the structure of compensation, and the prevalence of a two-tiered
compensation structure, in which high-wage workers receive health coverage and low-wage
workers do not.
The maximization of this utility function subject to the three constraints yields demand
equations, including the demand for leisure (usually shown as its corresponding work measure),
and the demand for good family health.  The key estimating equation, derived from the leisure
demand equation, is a structural LFP probit, in which the discrete labor force participation choice
is expressed as a function of the mother's demographic characteristics, her own health status and
that of her children, her potential market wage, the state's average AFDC grant, measures of the
value of public and private health insurance coverage, and controls for labor market conditions.
An important data measurement problem inherent in the analyses of health insurance issues
is the difficulty associated with measuring (or calculating) the individual's valuation of the health
coverage.  As explained by Moffitt and Wolfe (1992), there is more than one way to impute the
value of noncash benefits. Winkler (1991) relies on the government-cost approach, incorporating
4
     4This index is a proxy for health care expenditures by the privately insured.  It was developed by the Urban
Institute and the Center for Health Economics Research.  See Loprest and Gates (1993).  One advantage of using
these state-level valuation variables is their exogeneity.
     5This follows Moffitt and Wolfe (1992).
the government's total expenditures on Medicaid for a specific geographic area, divided by the
total number of individuals eligible for this benefit. Winkler does not address the issue of
employer-provided coverage, nor does she model the probability of public coverage. Moffitt and
Wolfe develop a family-specific proxy measuring the family's valuation of both Medicaid and
private coverage by incorporating "out-of sample" health care expenditures information (from the
1980 National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey, or NMCUES), and "matching"
these data to the primary data by utilization patterns. Like Winkler, Moffitt and Wolfe do not
address the endogeneity (and thus uncertainty) of Medicaid coverage.  The reliability of their
heterogeneity index is limited by the ability of that index to predict actual medical care
expenditures accurately for their SIPP estimating sample, and equation identification in a
complicated system of equations.  This paper extends the focus of Winkler and Moffitt and Wolfe,
and using simulations, updates the policy discussion to reflect the current debate.  The goal is to
identify a more straight-forward estimation technique to evaluate a broader array of policy
proposals.
The two key regressors in the structural LFP probit reflect the valuation of public and
private health insurance coverage.  They are weighted measures of the predicted probabilities of
public and private insurance coverage.  For public coverage, the weighting variable is the state's
average Medicaid expenditure per eligible resident.  For private coverage, the weighting variable
is a normalized private fee index that indicates how private physician fees vary across states.4
These two weighting variables adjust the predicted probabilities of coverage to reflect the valuation
of that coverage across states.
Predictions of the probability of public and private health insurance coverage are calculated
using results from a multinomial logit model, where zero equals no coverage, one equals Medicaid
coverage, and two equals employer-provided coverage.  These three health coverage states are
estimated jointly because it is likely that there is an unobserved variable affecting all three states.5
The resulting parameter estimates are used to construct the predicted probabilities of private and
public coverage.  Then, these predicted probabilities of private and public coverage for each
individual are multiplied by the corresponding weighting variables to create the insurance coverage
valuation variables.
Health status affects the single mother's wage level and employment choice directly.  An
unhealthy mother is more likely to be out of the labor force, and having ill children is likely to
have the same effect.  Consequently, dummy variables for the mother's and her children's health
status are included in the structural LFP probit.  The mother is considered to be unhealthy if she
5
     6Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) and Wolfe and Hill (1995) use a sum of eight reported measures of Activities of Daily
Living, which includes for example, wearing glasses.  The ADL questions in their 1984 SIPP data were asked of
each individual in the panel, whereas the more limited five questions in the 1987 panel were only asked of those
individuals reporting a serious health condition that lasted at least three months.  As a consequence of this
questioning scheme, the 1987 ADL's are unavailable for the bulk of the sample.  Winkler (1991) does not
incorporate information concerning health status.
     7See Heckman (1979).
reports fair or poor health.6 And, poor child health is indicated when the mother reports that any
of her children suffers from any sort of long-lasting physical, mental, or emotional condition
which limits his/her ability to run, work, or play.  As will be seen in the data section, poor
maternal health is much more prevalent in the data, and so likely to be more important in the labor
force participation decision.
A predicted wage measure is also included in the LFP probit, constructed by estimating
a sample-selection corrected wage equation for those with positive wages, and then predicting
wages for all observations in the sample.7
Other variables included in the LFP probit are age and years of education, dummy
variables indicating the presence of infant and preschool children, the state's average AFDC
benefit for a family of three, plus two more dummy variables to control residence in the South and
in a metropolitan area.  The LFP probit is written out in summary form below.
LFP = fn(predicted value of public coverage; predicted value of private coverage;
maternal health; child health; predicted wage; age; years of education; infant in
family; preschool child in family; state average AFDC benefit; residence in the
South; residence in a metropolitan area).
Results from the above probit are used to describe the relationship between the various regressors
and the probability of being employed.  Then, the results are used in policy simulations.
IV. Description of the Data 
These analyses rely on data drawn from the sixth interview of the 1987 Panel of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).   The interview month varies across individuals in
the SIPP, but ranges from July to December 1988.  The SIPP is a nationally representative
sample, and is comprised of a series of panel surveys first begun in 1983.
The estimating sample consists of single females, ages 18 through 55, who are mothers or
guardians of children under the age of 18.  Sample means are given in Table 1. There are 872
single women in the sample, of whom 531 (or 61 percent) participate in the labor force, and 423
(79.7 percent) work full time. The average age is 33.6, with a mean of 12 years of education.
6
Forty percent have a preschool-aged child, while nearly 20 percent have an infant. Fourteen
percent report being in fair or poor health, and 3.7 percent report having a child with a health
problem. Thirty-two percent of the sample is nonwhite.  In addition, 25 percent of the sample
reports receiving AFDC support, but 35 percent report having received AFDC at least once during
their lifetime.
Approximately 33 percent of the mothers are covered by Medicaid.  And, 61 percent of
the workers are covered by employer-provided health insurance coverage, compared to Swartz'
(1989) estimate of 64 percent for all U.S. workers. Consistent with high fixed costs of work, the
average hours worked per week equals 38, and the average hourly wage equals $8.23.  These
figures represent the "creaming" of the current welfare system:  those mothers with sufficient
qualifications to command a minimally subsistent compensation package are most likely to seek
market work.
  Approximately 40 percent of the sample have incomes below the poverty threshold, while
25.7 percent live between one and two times the poverty line.  Combining these two groups into
a single low-income sample of 576 mothers produces a more targeted group for the policy
simulations.  Means for this poverty sample are also given in Table 1. Forty-six percent of this
sample participates in the labor force (68.3 percent fulltime), earning an average wage of $5.61,
with 49 percent receiving employer-provided coverage. Forty-four percent of these mothers are
covered by Medicaid, 36 percent receive AFDC, and 51 percent have received AFDC at least
once during their lifetime.  This subgroup is a little younger and less educated than the full sample
(at 32.8 years of age and 11.4 years of education), and fewer have children under the age of six.
Nearly 18 percent of this sample reports being in fair or poor health.  Twelve percent of the full
sample and 18 percent of the low income sample report having received AFDC for at least five
years and so might lose AFDC (and Medicaid) coverage under some versions of welfare reform
currently under consideration.
V. Empirical Results
Coefficient estimates from the LFP probit are given in Table 2. The weighted public and
private health insurance coverage have the expected signs and both are statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. That is, increases in the weighted probability of public coverage reduce the
probability of LFP, while increases in the weighted probability of employer-provided coverage
increase the participation probability. These findings imply that Medicaid serves as a disincentive
to work, but that the availability of employer coverage might dissipate this effect somewhat.  
Poor maternal health has a significant negative impact on the probability of LFP, and the
absolute magnitude of this effect in the economy is likely to grow if recent budget cuts do indeed
reduce coverage, and therefore health, for poor single mothers. Poor child health has a negative
but not statistically significant impact on LFP, consistent with Salkever (1990). The wage
coefficient is significantly positive, with a corresponding elasticity equal to 1.5.  This estimate is
7
     8This finding is larger than the eight percent found by Moffitt and Wolfe.  Their simulation mandated coverage
for all workers, instead of just fulltime workers.  Also, their model treated Medicaid recipiency as certain and so
did not permit examination of policy changes that would affect Medicaid coverage.  Neither Moffitt and Wolfe or
Winkler examined low income single mothers.
consistent with previous findings in the literature, which tend to show large participation
elasticities but small hours elasticities for single mothers.
Each of the remaining significant coefficients reveal a negative relationship to employment.
In particular, being older and having more education have a negative impact on employment.
These effects are not inconsistent with the literature on single mothers.  And, as expected, the
presence of an infant or preschool child in the single mother family has a negative impact on
employment. This is due to the high cost of child care for younger children, as well as the greater
"psychic" cost associated with leaving very young children in non-maternal care. Residing in a
metropolitan area decreases the probability of employment, possibly due to the greater access to
welfare benefits. Finally, the probability of employment is lower for those single mothers residing
in states with higher monthly AFDC payments.
Four different policy simulations were implemented: (1) elimination of Medicaid coverage
for those single mothers with five or more total years of AFDC recipiency; (2) total elimination
of Medicaid coverage; (3) employer-mandated health insurance coverage for all full-time workers;
and (4) a combination of (1) and (3).  While only the first simulation relates directly to legislation
currently under debate, each of the simulations has been considered in recent months, and given
the budget crises likely to overtake many state budgets, the removal of large numbers of single
mothers from Medicaid coverage is not far-fetched.  Finally, while mandated employer-provided
coverage is inconsistent with current political leanings, it is interesting to show the relative
responsiveness in employment behavior of such a policy move.
The resulting mean predicted probabilities of employment resulting from each policy
simulation for both the full sample as well as the low-income sample are shown in Table 3. The
extension of the 5-year AFDC recipiency limit to Medicaid coverage has only a small impact on
the average predicted participation probability for the full sample, but increases the predicted
participation rate of the low-income sample by 21 percent. Totally eliminating Medicaid coverage
causes a 10 percent increase in the probability of participation for the full sample, and a 33 percent
increase for the low-income sample.  Of course, this simulation is an over-statement because
eliminating access to care for many individuals would affect maternal and child health, thereby
negatively influencing participation.
Mandating employer coverage for all full-time workers has the largest impact on
employment behavior for the full sample, causing a 14.3 percent increase.8  Again, this is merely
an approximation to the full effect of such a policy change because one would expect overall labor
demand to fall, and maternal and child health to improve.  This finding suggests that if the
impending significant cuts in the rate of growth of Medicaid and Medicare cause cost-shifting that
8
result ultimately in declining private coverage as well as worsening health, efforts to reduce the
welfare rolls will be hindered.  Finally, the last simulation shows the combined impacts of welfare
and health care reform undertaken jointly. Surprisingly, for the low-income sample, considering
these two policy revisions in combination does not differ substantively from the result of
instituting either change by itself. This finding is possibly due to the significant but limited role
health benefits play in the employment decision. 
This paper shows the importance of health insurance coverage and health status in the
employment decision.  Single mothers are quite responsive to issues of coverage when making
their participation decisions, and coverage is even more important to low income single mothers.
However, poor maternal health status is also a barrier to employment.  A primary
recommendation for policymakers is to proceed with caution when considering dramatic health
care and welfare reform.  While AFDC and Medicaid might serve as strong disincentives to work,
dramatically reducing expenditures for such support might also hinder employment as a
consequence of worsening maternal and child health and declining private coverage.
9
Table 1:  Variable Means (Standard deviations in parentheses)










































































































































Table 2:  Structural LFP Probit Coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Weighted probability of Medicaid coverage -0.0003**
(-2.00)
Weighted probability of employer coverage 1.46**
(2.17)
Poor maternal health -0.86***
(-5.97)









Years of education -0.17***
(-2.92)
Presence of an infant child -0.38***
(-2.71)
Presence of a preschool child -0.21*
(-1.79)
Residence in metropolitan area -0.23*
(-1.87)
Residence in the South 0.22
(1.41)





*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance
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Actual LFP 0.609 0.460
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